Gangs as Pseudo-Families: Giving Youth What They “Need”

From the outside looking in, gangs are comparable to family systems. In fact, as I will explain below, some gangs explicitly refer to themselves as “families” or “brotherhoods” and have mottos that encompass this familial idea. Robert Muller, a psychologist specializing in trauma, explained “that young adults join gangs because they both act as a surrogate family, as well as provide a sense of belonging…” Based on interviews conducted with current and former gang members, Muller stated:

Several gang members said that being part of a gang meant you were never alone in the world, which is similar to how many people describe being part of a close-knit family or group of friends. Gangs provide members a sense of belonging and protection they do not receive from other relationships or experiences in life.

(emphasis added)

Is this sense of belonging and protection what attracts children to gangs in the first place? The interviews Muller relied on revealed that “Bloods, Crips, and MS13 members all say they can identify with ‘Scarface.’ The feeling of being an outsider, dismissed and looked down on, is what gang members say drew them to their crews.” This explains why children in the foster care system may be more prone to joining gangs: they are often times, unfortunately, labelled as outsiders and looked at differently in comparison to children who are not involved in the child welfare system – a key reason they may feel alone and like they do not belong anywhere.

Continue reading “Gangs as Pseudo-Families: Giving Youth What They “Need””
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Who’s Watching the Watchers? – How Overrides Undercut Well-Measured Assessment Tools

In my last post we personified the real-life implications of discretion in the child welfare systems and how it can create inconsistency. We will now review current statutes, California’s most widely used policy manual, (the structured decision-making tool (SDM)), and culture of the agencies involved to uncover exactly why and how discretion can create inconsistencies that inflict further unnecessary trauma. The problem is not that child welfare agencies have discretion – every unique family deserves a response that best suits them – the problem is that this discretion is unfettered. There are clear steps and guidelines; however, a social worker can use something called an “override” (p.5) to change the course of a child welfare case based on their personal judgment. In this post I will illuminate unchecked discretion can have negative consequences for families.  

            It is important to have an overview of the juvenile dependency process before we go into the issues. First, a report of neglect or abuse is made to the child welfare service. These reports can be made by a law enforcement agent, officials at the child’s schools, family members, etc. Once a report is made, an official at the child welfare agency will determine whether and how quickly a response is warranted. Once a social worker responds, they have to make assessments about the risks of the child’s situation to determine what the best course of action will be (ie: open a case and work with the family, close the case, or remove the child). A social worker is to make those decisions, with or without the approval of a supervisor, using the SDM. These determinations will not be reviewed by a judge until the child welfare agency has a detention hearing, which can take days or weeks. 

I. Evaluation of Relevant Statutes

            California Welfare and Institution Code § 300 defines state law on the issue of removal. The subsection relevant to substance use related neglect is as follows:

(b)  (1)  The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. A child shall not be found to be a person described by this subdivision solely due to the lack of an emergency shelter for the family. 

If a report comes in and gets substantiated, a social worker can launch an investigation. If, during the course of investigation, it is determined that there is substantial risk of the child suffering then WIC § 300 is the controlling statute for removal. Although there are different potential causes for removal according to the statute, I would like to focus on substance use related neglect since this issue is at the heart of the overwhelming majority of child welfare cases.

            I would like to break down this statute to identify where the law grants discretion which creates opportunities for agents of the state to subjectively evaluate conditions. First, what constitutes “substantial risk?”  The statute lists substance abuse as a cause for willful or neglectful failure to care, but it does not state that that substance abuse automatically creates a substantial risk that the parent will willfully or negligently fail to care for the child.

            The determination of whether or not a child is at “substantial risk” is subjective and these crucial decisions are largely made by a case worker, with approval of a supervisor if there are issues that require overrides. Overrides are when a social worker uses their clinical experience to make judgment calls outside of the guidelines in the SDM. (pp. 8-9) This type of discretion is subject to implicit biases that social workers might carry, especially when it comes to substance use disorders.

            In many cases, substance use disorders can constitute grounds for removal; however, there is evidence that removal is typically not the best one for the child or parent involved. A child being yanked out of their home by strangers is extremely traumatic and is likely to cause long term suffering and issues; however, in some situations that might be in the best interest of both the parent and the child. Removal can have a positive impact on some parents by giving them a reason to begin to make serious life changes, but it can also drive a parent further down the rabbit hole of addiction by taking away the only thing that gave them hope to keep fighting to make those changes. Issues with removal are very complex and need to be tailored to individual situations, that is absolutely a fact. That fact is also the reason why these decisions should not be completely susceptible to the judgment of one social worker (and possibly a supervisor) without any safeguards or protection. Of course, discretion can also be used in ways that have a positive impact on families. However, this statute leaves a lot of room for subjectivity without any safeguards when making such a crucial decision about the trajectory of a child’s life.

            Next, California Welfare and Institutions Code § 309(a) governs the responsibilities of the child welfare agency to keep a child with their parent or at least, place the child with a family member. The law regarding placement is as follows:

309 (a) Upon delivery to the social worker of a child who has been taken into temporary custody under this article, the social worker shall immediately investigate the circumstances of the child and the facts surrounding the child’s being taken into custody and attempt to maintain the child with the child’s family through the provision of services. The social worker shall immediately release the child to the custody of the child’s parent, guardian, Indian custodian, or relative, regardless of the parent’s, guardian’s, Indian custodian’s, or relative’s immigration status, unless one or more of the following conditions exist:

(1) The child has no parent, guardian, Indian custodian, or relative willing to provide care for the child.

(2) Continued detention of the child is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of the child and there are no reasonable means by which the child can be protected in his or her home or the home of a relative.

According to this statute, the child welfare agency “shall… attempt to maintain the child with the child’s family through the provision of services.” The agency is not mandated to maintain the child with the child’s family through the provision of services. However, the agency is also not allowed to fail to exert any effort to maintain the child. This leaves the standard regarding continued detention – which states that it should only be used if there is immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of the child and there are “no reasonable means” that could protect child in their home or the home of a relative – subject to human judgement once again. Do “reasonable means” look the same in every case?

            Lastly, California Welfare and Institutions Code § 361.4 governs the emergency placement of children who have been declared dependents of the state and is as follows:

 (3) Notwithstanding paragraph (2), a child may be placed on an emergency basis if the CLETS information obtained pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) indicates that the person has been convicted of an offense not described in subclause (II) of clause (i) of subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (g) of Section 1522 of the Health and Safety Code, pending a criminal records exemption decision based on live scan fingerprint results if all of the following conditions are met:

(A) The conviction does not involve an offense against a child.

(B) The deputy director or director of the county welfare department, or his or her designee, determines that the placement is in the best interests of the child.

(C) No party to the case objects to the placement.

WIC § 361. 4 outlines the standards for clearing potential emergency placements in regard to criminal records. The statute indicates that placements can be approved even if the person who is intending to take temporary custody of the child has a criminal record, so long as the other conditions are met. One of these conditions is that “the deputy director or director of the county welfare department, or his or her designee, determines that the placement is in the best interest of the child.” This means that determining whether or not a family member is the best option for placement of a child despite a criminal conviction is ultimately left up to the judgment of a human with their own subjective beliefs. I would be interested to know how the agency would determine what was in the best interest of the child.

            As you can see, all of the statutes discussed above have discretion built into them. Like mentioned above, discretion can be used for positive outcomes like keeping families together, placing children with relatives who might have criminal records, or promptly removing kids out of dangerous situations when the SDM might not call for those actions. However, in light of the entire process and the lack of guidance or oversight until after these decisions have been made, and the fact that these decisions can have traumatic consequences that cannot be undone it should not be so easy to use discretion to circumvent a well-established tool.

II. The Role of Risk Assessment

            Every county in California utilizes the structured decision-making tool to inform their decisions regarding child dependency. Levels of risk determine the decisions made by the child welfare agency involved about a particular case. The section regarding substance abuse of a caregiver states,

The caregiver is diagnosed with chemical dependency or abuse AND is currently using. Current use does not require that caregiver be under the influence at the moment of the call, but that the caregiver has used within the past two weeks and has not entered into a formal or informal program to achieve abstinence; OR The caregiver is using illegal drugs; OR The caregiver’s alcohol use suggests a probability that dependency or abuse exists, such as blackouts, secrecy, negative effects on job or relationships, identified drinking patterns, etc. (p.28)

I thought it was interesting that a person with a substance use disorder (not alcohol) can be classified as neglectful even if they haven’t used in two weeks, yet a person with an alcohol dependency is afforded a more thorough evaluation of how their drinking affects their ability to care for the child.

            The structured decision-making tool is intended to assist child welfare agents make risk assessments throughout the process described earlier. However, not every decision will be dictated by the SDM because each and every step recommends a certain action but also gives an easy “check this box and explain” override option that can be used retroactively.

            This seems like a major problem. Let’s look closer at the override options to uncover how “checking a box” to avert the recommended course of action can be problematic. The first step in the SDM is determining whether or not the report requires a response and this step has an “override” option. (p.5) This is when the agency has received a report of neglect and is determining the next course of action.

Continue reading “Who’s Watching the Watchers? – How Overrides Undercut Well-Measured Assessment Tools”

Why are we Failing in Scaling Up our Successful Pilot Projects?

My name is Dayaar Singla and I am an international exchange student from India’s National Academy of Legal Studies and Research (NALSAR) University of Law, Hyderabad. My interest in this course was piqued by Prof. Ball’s description of how this is a “class as a think-tank”. Further, it is extremely interesting for me to study the Foster Care System in California as the entire concept is extremely alien for someone from India. This helps me in providing an outsider’s perspective to the class discussions.

In my understanding, resolution of any policy issue follows a 4 step process which can be shown as:

While my colleagues will be working on identifying the various problems that exist with the Foster Care System in California and attempt to propose solutions to rectify some of them, I due to my lack of understanding of the US socio-cultural and political system have decided to look at a broader problem that policymakers seem to be facing. In a number of social programs, we seem to be coming across the replication crisis which has been previously documented in scientific research. While some solutions proposed at Stage II seem to give successful results when they are tested in a pilot project, policymakers seem to be failing in being able to replicate the results when these projects are scaled up.

Over the series of my blog posts, I will first be introducing the replication crisis, as has been observed in other fields; then I will analyze successful pilot projects which failed to replicate their success when they were scaled up and attempt to draw out the commonalities between them. Finally, I will try to provide best practices that might help policymakers in designing pilot projects which eliminate some of the commonly observed factors leading to their failure on being scaled up.

What Is The Purpose Of Bail? It Depends On Who You Talk To

While discussing the California bail system, a Santa Clara County district attorney said, “It’s just so difficult to get guilty pleas from defendants who are NOT in custody.” (Emphasis added) These statements, along with many others I’ve heard over the course of my research, serve to reinforce common misunderstandings about the bail system. These misunderstandings, in turn, have misdirected conversations about what the U.S. bail system is intended to accomplish.

Immediately after hearing the district attorney make this statement, I thought to myself, “if a defendant is truly guilty, a fast and easy guilty plea would certainly save the county a lot of resources and it would be in the best interest of the community because it would ensure speedy justice for the victim.” However, a fast and easy plea deal is not beneficial to everyone when we consider the effects of detaining individuals prior to trial.

Over 62% of county jail inmates are NON-CONVICTED individuals. This means that over half of the jail population is made up of people who have not yet been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Individuals accused of a misdemeanor spend more than 30 days in jail before they are tried and either found not guilty or convicted. When we consider all of this, it’s reasonable to assume that many individuals who are wrongfully accused may be coerced into a guilty plea simply because they are desperate to get out of jail.

District attorneys are charged with proving an accused individual’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Negotiating plea deals is also an important and necessary part of their job. Therefore, keeping defendants in custody is beneficial to this part of their work because it provides an incentive for the accused to agree. This however, has absolutely nothing to do with the purposes of the U.S. bail system. Stated another way, the U.S. bail system is not in place to keep a defendant in custody for the sake of helping district attorneys do their jobs. In this post, I will provide commentary on other misconceptions I’ve found during my research.

To date, I have uncovered and corrected some of the misleading information available to the public about the U.S. bail system in an attempt to foster public discourse in a meaningful way. In a previous post, I took it upon myself to provide readers with a thorough understanding of the term “bail.” Unsurprisingly, when I read a publication that uses misleading information to further spread the belief that bail must always involve money, or that it should accomplish anything other than what its meant to accomplish, I am quick to respond with complete and accurate information.

On November 1, 2012, the Golden State Bail Agents Association published a testimonial written by one of their attorneys, Mr. Albert W. Ramirez. Mr. Ramirez’s testimony, while not technically wrong, is misleading and demands some elaboration. This testimony was made before the California General Assembly. In this post, I don’t intend to disprove Mr. Ramirez and I don’t intend for this post to serve as a response to his statements. I only cite to his testimony because it provides an illustration of the common misconceptions I’ve found during my research.

In this post, I will supply that elaboration by offering an accurate statement of the issue at hand and then following with an explanation of how the statements made by Mr. Ramirez are misleading. I don’t urge readers to read or accept Mr. Ramirez’s testimony because I have taken issue with the way in which it misleads readers. Further, it is not necessary to read the testimony as I’ve included the relevant statements for my commentary.

Myth: Money bail opponents think bail is too expensive.

Truth: Advocates for bail system reform seek to reduce the number of detained pretrial defendants in order to achieve a fair and effective system.

Mr. Ramirez maintains that, “California’s commercial bail system has been under attack by the ACLU” and that the “ACLU’s primary criticism of commercial bail is that it’s too expensive.” (Page 1) First and foremost, “the attack” as he calls it is not necessarily on the commercial bail system, as the ACLU and other groups have clearly indicated that their concerns are directly associated with the entire bail system as a whole. On numerous occasions, the ACLU has specifically been critical of the money bail system for the detrimental effects it has on the poor. For example, a dangerous but wealthy individual may be released from custody by paying money bail while a person who does not pose a danger to society may be held simply because they cannot afford to do the same. Both of these scenarios are bad for obvious reasons and have absolutely nothing to do with the commercial bail system.

Further, concerns over the U.S. bail system stem from the large numbers of individuals currently incarcerated. While the ACLU has indeed urged states to pass more stringent regulations for regulating commercial bail, it’s important for readers to be aware that stringent regulation is not an attack on the commercial bail industry, but rather a means for protecting the rights of the indigent, who happen to be the clients of private commercial bail companies. Some states such as New Jersey have already taken steps towards this.

Myth: The effectiveness of any bail system is best measured by failure to appear rates.

Truth: The bail system is in place to both ensure a defendant’s appearance at court and ensure public safety.

Many commercial bail supporters (including Mr. Ramirez) misguidedly rely on the failure to appear (FTA) rates to argue that commercial bail is much more effective than other forms of release such as Own Recognizance release (OR). David Ball at the Santa Clara University School of Law illustrates why FTA is not a great measure of effectiveness. For the purposes of this post, the key takeaway from Professor Ball’s article is the fact that while the bail system is in place to ensure a defendant’s appearance in court, that’s not all it’s meant to accomplish and ensure.

Mr. Ramirez correctly states, “Our criminal justice system cannot function if defendants fail to appear for their court proceedings,” but he completely disregards the fact that these failure to appear rates do not capture the whole picture. (Page 1) For one thing, a defendant may be returned to custody due to being rearrested (possibly on different charges). When that occurs, there is virtually no chance that he will miss any court dates as he is in custody and the jail officials will simply surrender him to the court on his given court date. Mr. Ramirez, like many other commercial bail proponents, completely ignores the fact that the justice system is also meant to guarantee a defendant’s release under the least restrictive conditions and ensure public safety.

Myth: Commercial bail is a necessary component of the criminal justice system.

Truth: There are many alternatives to commercial bail such as releasing people on “bail” without the need for bail bonds.

The effectiveness of a pretrial release method must include considerations of both the defendant’s likelihood to appear for their scheduled court date and their threat to public safety. As already mentioned, bail is meant to ensure that a defendant appears at his court date. This requires the court to impose certain conditions upon a defendant’s release in order to ensure that he shows up to his court date. When determining bail terms and conditions, a judge is required to consider whether the defendants pose a risk to public safety.

Mr. Ramirez cites to “The most comprehensive study ever done on bail” in an attempt to undercut the entire purpose of bail by simply focusing on failure to appear. (Page 3) The testimony ignores the fact that pretrial release determinations vary from state to state with regards to criteria used and the specific conditions of release. In some states, defendants are much more likely to be released with little to no consideration of their threat to public safety or their likelihood to appear in court. This is important because a pretrial system that considers the threat to public safety in their determination for release will likely provide a much more thorough interview and as such likely to release fewer defendants.

Mr. Ramirez states that “A risk assessment tool is merely a questionnaire consisting of a list of factors that have been shown to correlate one way or another with criminality or flight risk.” and then proceeds to question the validity of such findings. (Page 6) Specifically noteworthy is the fact that Mr. Ramirez’s fails to acknowledge that some jurisdiction, such as Santa Clara, have a comprehensive system in which defendants are thoroughly interviewed and the determination about their release is made after a long process.

In Santa Clara County, federal and state constitutional protections from excessive bail are often successfully implemented through pretrial release programs.

One key issue in Mr. Ramirez’s testimony is the fact that many of his statements rely on the idea or assumption that people have “the right to bail.” As previously stated, “bail” refers to all types of pretrial release, not just those made in exchange for money. (Page 3) The protections and rights prescribed by the federal and California constitutions do not guarantee that an individual is entitled to any specific type of release from custody. In fact, some defendants are not entitled to any kind of release at all.

It is certainly true that many California residents, along with many other U.S. residents, have money bail set, and that they often use commercial bail companies when they cannot afford to pay the full amount of money required by the court. Thus, while many residents use commercial bail companies to secure their release from custody, it is not true that “bail” is usually implemented through commercial bail companies. Courts not only release defendants by setting an amount of money that must be paid by the defendant to the court—they also release defendants on certain conditions, or simply cite and release the individual with a promise to return to court.

More importantly, protections from excessive bail are embedded in the Constitution of the United States as well as in many state constitutions. Unlike the misguided statement I quoted at the beginning of this post, these protections are specifically designed to protect defendants from entering into coerced or false guilty pleas. Also, contrary to popular belief, this protection does not grant an individual the right to pay a bail agent a large sum of money in exchange for his freedom.

This protection simply grants an individual the right to be released from custody, while he awaits his trial, under the least restrictive conditions. I mention the term “popular belief” because this is yet another misguided assumption that a lot of Americans (myself included) have been led to believe by statements from officials in high positions (like the district attorney), news coverage, and other popular media.

Why does this all matter? Misunderstandings about the U.S. bail system and the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment have limited conversations about how this system can be improved both to ensure community safety and a defendants appearance in court. Money bail has become the norm and many have accepted it as the only system simply because it’s all we have known. These limitations have blinded most people from truly appreciating the fact that money bail does not accomplish any of its goals. These limitations have also allowed many to ignore the fact that there are alternatives to bail. A meaningful conversation about bail reform is long overdue and it must begin with accurate information.

 

 

 

Risk-Based Bail- The Money Bail Fix since 1966. Part 1- How The Bail Reform Acts Tackle Money-Bails Biggest Problems.

While money bail is deeply flawed, the answer to this problem will require more than just getting rid of commercial bail bond companies; they are a mere symptom of the “one size fits all” bail schedule model. The solution as we will see is risk-based bail. It’s recently been employed in New Jersey and hailed as the ideal model. But as novel as it sounds, risk-based bail has been around since before we set foot on the moon. For over 40 years, the federal courts have been able to tailor release based upon the risks of a specific defendant, be that failure to appear (FTA), or danger to the community. Further, these risks are mitigated with the least restrictive measures available. Assuming a defendant’s risks are accurately measured, conditions exist to mitigate risk, those conditions are actually enforced, there is no apparent need for the bail bondsmen. This is probably why there is no federal bail schedule and hardly any bondsmen in federal court.

There is often a distinction between law in the books, and law on the ground. As such, this post focuses on the former: the history of congressional bail reform, the alternative bonds used in federal court, and how we got the current elements of risk-based bail. The follow up post demonstrates one such instance of how risk-based bail has been rolled out here in the federal Northern District of California.

Continue reading “Risk-Based Bail- The Money Bail Fix since 1966. Part 1- How The Bail Reform Acts Tackle Money-Bails Biggest Problems.”

Rewriting Inequity: Policy Recommendations for CA PC 1305

So far this semester, I have written about the text of California Penal Code Section 1305. Most of that time has been taken up with discussing the problems with bail forfeiture and exoneration that arise from the way the law is written and implemented. In this final installment, I will address two problems I have raised over the last two posts: (1) affordability of bail and the bail schedule; and (2) amending PC 1305 so that it does not favor bail bond companies. By way of solutions to those problems, I will offer some policy recommendations for the California bail framework as we move into a time where the state-level bail system is getting some much-needed attention from criminal justice reformers.

Bail has come to mean a lot of different things. However, at its base, bail is simply the mechanism by which we attempt to guarantee the defendant comes to his or her court dates, while, at the same time, maximizing public safety and minimizing restraints on a defendant’s liberty. Since money bail is not working toward these intended purposes, it is time we get rid of it. There are other forms of pretrial release that do a much better job of getting the defendant to come to court when he or she is supposed to, and enable real criminal justice professionals to keep track of the defendant.

In general, the best way to fix the bail system in California is to abolish money bail in favor of a combination of preventive detention and pretrial release with supervision (first paragraph of page) similar to the structures in place in Washington, D.C. and New Jersey. However, that would require a complete overhaul of judges, jails, and a thriving quasi-insurance industry (bail bond companies). Since that is both unlikely to take root quickly and outside of the topics I have addressed so far, this post will focus on possible policy solutions and recommendations for PC 1305 specifically.

No One Can Afford the Better Option: Cash Bail and the Bail Schedule

Cash bail – as compared to commercial surety bail, or bail bonds – is always reserved as an option for defendants, but it is rarely taken. Few defendants can afford to deposit the full bail amount with the court, because the scheduled bail amounts are so high. This is especially true in the case of individuals who are accused of misdemeanors, where bail is most often set according to the bail schedule, usually between $1,000 and $10,000.

If the system is meant to ensure the defendant comes to trial – which it is – then the amounts should be high enough to matter, but should still take into account (1) the defendant’s ability to pay, along with (2) potential risks to the public’s safety if that person gets out. With those as the two chief considerations in setting bail, judges can tailor bail amounts to individual defendants enough to be effective, while not inflicting prison time upon them for their lack of assets. Conversely, the rich will no longer have access to freedom while the poor do not. Today, so long as the person has not been charged with a capital offense, for which there would be no bail, rich defendants can get out of jail almost immediately by buying a bail bond, regardless of how dangerous they are to the public.

As the Santa Clara County website says, “[t]he Bail Schedule is the presumptive bail in many, but not all statutory offenses.” Judges are permitted to depart from the bail schedule but almost never do, since they really have no reason to do so. It’s already been agreed to by a majority of the judges in the county, so it comes prepared with a stamp of approval. However, judges can and should take advantage of that discretion in setting bail to alleviate foundational problems ranging from jail overcrowding to the simple fact that pretrial detention only affects people negatively (PDF page 3-4), especially low-risk defendants. That is, keeping people in jail, discerning which defendants are not a public safety risk and will most likely come back for their court dates can be, and has been, accurately done. At the very least, if money bail has to continue being part of our criminal justice system, then defendants that we can safely let out should be able to get out of jail.

Get Rid of the Bail Schedule

Getting rid of the Bail Schedule altogether is the most efficient way to discern which defendants are either flight risks or dangerous, so that judges have to make individualized determinations, and will hopefully choose to take advantage of risk assessment tools. One logical counterargument to that point is that judges just don’t have the time to consider each defendant’s unique circumstances, so the Bail Schedule is simply a creature of convenience that helps the criminal justice system run smoothly. The obvious response is that we are dealing with a person’s freedom, as well as their future. The Bail Schedule lets judges use it as a default, since it is the “presumptive bail,” but the standard amounts are too high for many defendants. Thus, adherence to the Bail Schedule results in unnecessary pretrial detention. Any jail time is bad, but unnecessary jail time is considerably worse. As an Arnold Foundation study found, “low-risk defendants who were detained pretrial for more than 24 hours were more likely to commit new crimes not only while their cases are pending, but also years later” (PDF, page 4: “The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention”). Clearly, we hope that criminal justice is both making society safer and better generally – part of which is lowering crime.

If jail time is causing an increase in crime, then the criminal justice system – legislators, judges, and prosecutors – should concentrate on alternatives to jail time. As an added benefit, jails will become less crowded and, hopefully, get back on track by inflicting pretrial detention only on the people who cannot be freed safely. Additionally, the county will save money. It costs the county, and therefore taxpayers, $204 per day for a single inmate (PDF, page 22) to stay in Santa Clara’s Main Jail pretrial. The cost of pretrial supervision – for those defendants who require supervision – is estimated at $15 per day (PDF, page 22). Some defendants don’t even need to be supervised.

If the argument for the Bail Schedule is convenience, and replacing that convenience for a different kind of convenience could bring about all of the positive effects above, then it seems like a worthwhile trade. Now I’ll turn to a discussion of how to remedy some of the problems with PC 1305 from the legislative side.

Rewriting PC 1305

Throughout my posts in the last couple of months, and most of the other posts on this blog, there are a few common threads, one of which is: bail bond companies are getting off too easy. One of the many reasons that is true is that PC 1305 is written in a way that favors bail bond companies, so the entire process – from getting a defendant out of jail to when they go to trial, or don’t – is written to give bail bond companies as many chances as possible to make money and dodge liability.

Stop Construing PC 1305 “in Favor of the Surety”

One of the most glaring problems with the way PC 1305 functions is that courts are actually required to construe the law in bail bond companies’ favor. As far back as 1975, in a case called People v. Wilshire Insurance Company, and as recently as 2015, in People v. United States Fire Insurance Company, courts have insisted on statements such as “[t]he Penal Code sections governing forfeiture of bail bonds must be strictly construed in favor of the surety to avoid the harsh results of forfeiture.” In People v. US Fire Insurance Company, the court explained further that, “strict construction of bail forfeiture statutes compels the court to protect the surety.” Even if the law were not written in favor of bail bond companies, it would still be treated as if it was. Why?

One explanation is that “the law traditionally disfavors forfeitures and this disfavor extends to forfeiture of bail.” People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. However, bail bond companies are not traditional companies – they are little insurance companies who are guarded by huge insurance companies, which end up playing a critical role in the criminal justice system, in pursuit of profit. Because judges often – if not always – rely on the Bail Schedule, bail agents end up making the determination of which defendants get out of jail and which defendants stay in custody without regard for public safety. Their motivation is profit, so the defendants who get out are the ones who can pay for it, and who have high enough bail set to be profitable.

Bail bond companies and their agents should have higher risk of forfeiting their potential monetary gain, because they are responsible for both keeping the public safe by not letting out dangerous criminals, and getting those out who should be out, and then ensuring they go to trial. The stakes are much higher than for, say, car insurance, where the risk and reward are purely financial. In the bail context, the bond companies’ risks are financial, but the same risk for an individual is his or her liberty, which should hold a much higher price.

185 Days is Too Long

When a defendant fails to appear, the bond company has 185 days to find them and bring them back before the bond company loses any money. They can also attempt to extend that period by 180 days if they file a motion with the court pursuant to 1305.4. Bail bond companies exist to get people out of jail pretrial, with the promise to bring them back for trial. If any other person (or entity) in any other kind of job failed to do the single thing they were supposed to, it would be crazy to give them either 6 months or a year to finish the task they were supposed to have done in the first place, and then pay them for it.

Bail bond companies need to keep better track of defendants so that they don’t fail to appear. If a bonded defendant does fail to appear, the bail bond company should not still make money. Thus, the bond should be actually forfeited when the defendant fails to appear. Or, at least, whatever the bond company got from the defendant should go to the court. To bring it full circle, allowing defendants to give a deposit to the court in cash, the same way they would pay a bail bondsman, would solve this whole problem. Then the defendant has a reason to come to court, and no one makes money for being terrible at his or her job.

Rearrest Should Not Equal Exoneration

When a defendant is out on bond and is rearrested, the bond is exonerated and the surety is freed of all obligations. Bail bond companies purport to protect public safety. However, almost 30% of people in Santa Clara County that bail bondsmen bail out of jail are rearrested. When a bail bond company bails out a defendant who is likely to commit another crime, it endangers the public. Thus, when a defendant commits a crime while out on bond, as more than a quarter of Santa Clara defendants post bond do, the bail bond company should forfeit either the entire bond or at least the portion they charged the defendant.

Conclusion:

There are many problems with PC 1305, but there are also many open avenues for solutions. Reform can come from judges by using discretion in setting bail, so that defendants get individualized assessments, even if it means that they see fewer defendants per day. The legislature should carefully consider the effects of PC 1305 according to the above critiques, to make sure the statute is bringing about its intention; not just benefitting huge companies making a safe investment in someone’s freedom, or incarceration. Finally, prosecutors can mitigate some of the damage 1305 does by not asking for higher bail or defaulting to the bail schedule in cases where ability to pay is a factor, and by giving more credence to tools-based risk assessments used by Pretrial Services.

Money Can buy you Happiness in Jail

As I have previously discussed, the criminal justice system has become an avenue for the government to make money. We are seeing an influx of cities, counties, and states using criminal charges as a basis for monetary charges assed in exchange for someone’s physical freedom during pretrial, to charge for basic needs while in custody, and to charge for post-sentencing court-imposed requirements. My previous post focused on pretrial release fines and fees and my next post will hone in on the fines and fees related to diversion programs and post-sentencing release, which means this post will illustrate fines and fees imposed while in custody.

A defendant may be in custody at any time once she is arrested for a crime. She may be in custody both pending and during trial because she was ineligible for release (either by statute, a judge’s discretion, or because she did not have the means to pay for her release), or she may be in custody as part of her sentencing. Typically, a person in jail, opposed to prison, is there either pretrial or during trial but pre-conviction; awaiting sentencing and/or transfer to another facility; or serving a relatively short sentence, usually a term less than one year. Prisons are long-term holding facilities that typically house individuals who were convicted of a felony and sentenced to serve more than one year. This post will include fines and fees imposed and collected in both jails and prisons. 

Pay to Stay

The in-custody fee that tends to have the most visceral reaction is the practice of ‘paying to stay’ or charging a ‘per diem’ fee. These fees, typically utilized by county jails, but also in place in prisons, actually charge inmates a daily ‘room and board’ fee for being incarcerated, as if the person 804af573e62f82bd5a90a97b187e0671checked into a hotel. Nationwide, it is unclear whether or not these fees begin accruing while a person is in custody prior to sentencing, if the per diems are only imposed once sentencing has taken place, or if, like in California, the fees can be charged retroactively for pre-sentencing custodial time after a person has been sentenced. Continue reading “Money Can buy you Happiness in Jail”